Why your neighbor matters: Positions in preferential trade agreement networks and export growth in global value chains by Park, Jong Hee & Kim, Byung Koo
Economics & Politics. 2020;32:381–410. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/ecpo   | 381© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Received: 20 May 2019 | Revised: 27 August 2019 | Accepted: 28 December 2019
DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12152  
O R I G I N A L  A R T I C L E
Why your neighbor matters: Positions in 
preferential trade agreement networks and export 
growth in global value chains*
Jong Hee Park1  |   Byung Koo Kim2
*We thank Lai-Ha Chan, Christina Davis, In Song Kim, Soo Yeon Kim, Srividya Jandhyala, Chia Yi Lee, Iain Osgood, 
Krzysztof Pelc, Lena Rechel, Pedro Silva, Yunkyu Sohn and participants of seminars at ESSEC, Annual Meeting of the 2019 
Midwest Political Science Association, Princeton University, and Seoul National University for their helpful and constructive 
comments. Jong Hee Park was supported by College of Social Sciences, Seoul National University (200-20170105), the 
National Research Foundation of Korea Grant (NRF-2016-S1A3A2924409), and Fung Global Fellows Program in Princeton 
Institute for International & Regional Studies, Princeton University. Supplementary information is available in Jong Hee 
Park’s website (http://jhp.snu.ac.kr). 
1Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea
2University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, 
USA
Correspondence




In rapidly expanding global and regional preferential trade 
agreements (PTA) networks, policy-makers are keen to sit-
uate their countries in a better position, believing that a bet-
ter position in PTA networks will help their economies trade 
more and grow faster. In this paper, we provide a theory that 
explains how changes in countries’ PTA network positions 
affect their trade performance. We argue that a dense and 
deep “neighbor network” provides a country with a wide 
access to global value chains, better  protection to invest-
ment, and strong credibility to their policy commitments. 
To measure trade performance, we compute value-added 
exports at the country, year, and industry level across 43 
countries, 56 industries, and 15 years (2000–14). The esti-
mation of network position effects is done by panel fixed-
effects methods and the sample-splitting and cross-fitting 
double machine-learning method. The findings show that as 
a country's neighbors have deeper and wider PTA networks, 
the country's value-added exports grow faster. Also, the in-
dustry-level analysis shows that sectors heavily engaging in 
the fragmentation of production stages exhibit faster growth 
with the improvement of neighbor networks.
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
Does a better-positioned country in the preferential trade agreement (PTA) network grow faster? While 
academics have long emphasized the importance of network position in international trade (Baldwin, 
2008; Deltas, Desmet, & Facchini, 2012; Hur, Alba, & Park, 2010; Kowalczyk & Wonnacott, 1992; 
Krugman, 1993b; Mukunoki & Tachi, 2006; Wonnacott, 1975), the proliferation of bilateral or re-
gional PTAs since the 1990s has reignited interest in positional advantages in a growing web of trade 
agreements. Politicians in industrialized countries have not hesitated to capitalize on this idea to im-
prove the competitive advantages of their countries.
For example, President Roh Moo-Hyun of the Republic of Korea chose PTAs as the “engine of 
growth” and announced that his government will select PTA partners in a way to transform Korea into 
“the Northeast Asian economic hub” and “a hub of the global market (Presidential Advisory Policy 
Committee, 2008, 37).” Similarly, the Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau was advised to pur-
sue the goal of becoming “a global trading hub and a nexus for global supply chains” through PTAs 
(Advisory Council on Economic Growth, 2017, 2). Also, Japan recently adopted the national strategy 
of “accelerating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and other economic partnership negotiations” to 
“strengthen the competitiveness of Japan as a business hub” (Government of Japan, 2014, 7).
The spread of the hub-seeking PTA strategy as an international economic policy objective poses 
several interesting questions. First, what constitutes a “hub” in PTA networks? Second, does hub 
status, if correctly defined, actually increase the competitive advantage of a country in international 
trade? The goal of this paper is to answer these two questions.
First, we present the new theoretical concept of node importance in PTA networks, which closely 
reflects and further clarifies what the policy dialogue and trade literature vaguely call a “hub” in 
trade relations. The key insight is that a country's value-added exports are heavily dependent not only 
on the PTA connections they make with others, but also on the PTA connections their PTA partners 
make with others. The idea that important nodes in a network can be identified by the importance of 
its partners is well established in the network literature (Bonacich, 1987; Burt, 2010; Katz, 1953). For 
example, Burt (2010) calls the subset of networks created by the set of actors directly connected to an 
actor a “neighbor network” and argues that “well-connected neighbors can be a source of opportunity 
and resource” in social relations (Burt, 2010, 1–6).
There are several channels through which a country's neighbor network in PTAs affects its econo-
my's trade performance in global value chains (GVCs). The first channel is tariffs. According to Wang, 
Wei, Xinding, and Zhu (2017), inputs move back and forth from two to seven countries on average 
within GVCs until they are absorbed into the destination market. As tariffs are applied on gross im-
ports rather than on value additions, even small tariffs on intermediate inputs can accumulate and take 
up a significant portion of the price of a final product. As a result, tariffs between a pair of countries 
resonate to affect all countries involved in the production network (OECD, 2013). This “magnification 
effect” could pose a substantial burden to exporting firms. Well-connected nodes in PTA networks are 
more likely to cover important suppliers of intermediate inputs; hence, countries with well-connected 
nodes in PTA networks face a lower level of tariff accumulation in production networks than countries 
that have neighbors with poor or no connections.
K E Y W O R D S
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The second channel is investment. Many studies have shown that “deep” PTAs covering a range 
of non-tariff policy areas such as investment protection, dispute settlement mechanisms, technical 
standards, and labor and environmental regulations, among others, have larger effects on participating 
countries’ economies (Antràs & Staiger, 2012; Baier, Yotov, & Zylkin, 2019; Baldwin, 2016; Chase, 
2009; Kim, Milner, et al., 2019; Kim, Lee, & Tay, 2019; Orefice & Rocha, 2014; Osgood, 2018). The 
main route through which deep PTAs exert greater effects is the connection of firms across multiple 
production sites. A country with well-connected and deep-PTA seeking neighbors has a lower level 
of policy uncertainty and provides better protection for investments than a country without well-con-
nected and deep-PTA seeking neighbors.
Our argument for the importance of neighbor networks provides an important refinement of existing 
theories of trade agreements. Büthe and Milner (2008) and Mansfield and Milner (2012) emphasize that 
trade agreements provide credible signals of policy consistency to domestic and international audiences 
by tying the hands of policy-makers. We refine this argument from a network perspective and argue that 
the value of a PTA as a commitment device depends on how important their PTA partners and partners 
of their partners are. Forming “deep” trade agreements with well-connected and deep-agreement seeking 
countries in PTA networks makes a country's commitment to policy consistency and investment protec-
tion more credible than forming shallow PTAs with peripheral and shallow-agreement seeking countries.
It is one thing to clarify the concept of a hub in PTA networks. But to empirically investigate 
whether changes in a hub status actually affect the competitive advantage of a country in interna-
tional trade is quite another. There are two empirical challenges to this task. First, changes in bilat-
eral trade flow between a pair of countries do not always capture changes in competitive advantage 
between them. As Baldwin (2016) points out, international trade in the 21st century is characterized 
by widely dispersed production stages (or tasks) across borders. What are more commonly known as 
global value chains (GVCs) more accurately describe this new facet of international trade. In GVCs, 
the division of labor across industries and countries is emphasized more than the total volume of 
cross-country exchange (bilateral trade flows). PTAs can introduce changes to the global division of 
labor (through industry-specific tariffs, trade diversion, etc.) without altering aggregate bilateral trade 
flows. Therefore, “competitive advantage” should be able to reflect on countries’ unique contribu-
tions to GVCs, which aggregate bilateral flows cannot properly capture (e.g.Amador & Cabral, 2016; 
Baldwin, 2013, 2016; Elms & Low, 2013; UNIDO, 2018). Second, even when we have an adequate 
measure of a country's competitive advantage, it may still be challenging to isolate its effect from other 
endogenous trade-related factors that affect both competitive advantage and the formation of PTAs.
To tackle these empirical challenges, we test the importance of neighbor networks in PTAs on trade 
performance within GVCs using a dataset of value-added contributions at the country, year, and indus-
try level. Scholars of international trade note that fragmentation of production stages “mandates a new 
approach to trade data collection” (Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg, 2008, 1996). As such, more and more 
scholars of international political economy turn to GVCs to test their theoretical arguments (Jensen, 
Quinn, & Weymouth, 2015; Kim, Milner, et al., 2019). Following this trend, we use a new measure of 
value-added exports in our empirical test. The input data were obtained from the World Input-Output 
Dataset (WIOD) (Timmer, Dietzenbacher, Los, Stehrer, & Vries, 2015; Timmer, Los, Stehrer, & Vries, 
2016), covering 43 countries and 56 industries from 2000 to 2014. We decompose the multicountry and 
multisector input–output table into value-added exports at the country–industry–year level using the 
method proposed by Wang, Wei, and Zhu (2018) (WWZ decomposition hereafter).
One important empirical concern in our design is the homophilous nature of PTAs. That is, 
countries with similar backgrounds tend to flock together in PTA networks and trade heavily with 
each other. To address this issue, we need to include a comprehensive list of control variables and 
fixed effects at the country and year level. One problem with this standard panel treatment is that 
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misspecification of any of these variables (e.g. omitting higher degree interactions) may cause a bias 
in the estimation of our causal variable. To minimize this bias, we use the machine-learning based 
panel two-stage regression approach, known as the sample-splitting and cross-fitting panel double 
machine-learning (DML) method (Belloni, Chernozhukov, & Hansen, 2014; Chernozhukov et al., 
2017; Semenova, Goldman, Taddy, & Chernozhukov, 2018). 
The results of our analysis show strong evidence for the positive PTA hub effect on value-added 
export growth. That is, countries with strong PTA hub status (i.e. countries with well-connected and 
deep-agreement seeking neighbors) have higher domestic and foreign value-added export growth than 
those with weak PTA hub status. The effects are pronounced among countries in the middle of produc-
tion chains such as Singapore, Japan, and South Korea. We also find that PTA hub effects have strong 
distributional implications at the industry level. Manufacturing and service sectors especially those 
with fragmented production processes using advances in information and communications technology 
grow faster as the PTA hub status of the country improves.
2 |  POSITIONAL ADVANTAGE IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Scholars have long pointed out the importance of a country's position as a source of competitive ad-
vantage in international trade, and the concept of a hub has played a central role in this discussion. 
This is largely due to the popularity of the hub-and-spoke structure as a simple conceptual device to 
theorize complex trade relations. The hub-and-spoke structure in international trade first appeared in 
Wonnacott (1975), who proposed a hub-seeking strategy for his country, Canada, to survive between 
two dominant trading blocs, the United States and Europe.
Canada should now simultaneously approach the U.S. for an industrial free trade agree-
ment, and simultaneously (or soon thereafter) approach the EEC for an industrial free 
trade agreement … , and approach the remaining Efta (sic) countries (in particular, 
Sweden and Switzerland) for a similar agreement with them. This solution is not a simple 
one; but it may be the best means of satisfying both our [Canada’s] economic and polit-
ical objectives (Wonnacott, 1975, 120, emphasis original).
Interestingly, it was Israel that put Wonnacott's proposal into reality. Israel formed a trade agreement 
with the European Union in 1975 and with the United States in 1985, which made Israel a classic example 
of a hub connecting two large trading blocs. Deltas et al. (2012) estimated that “trade between Israel and 
the EU increased by an additional 29% after the introduction of the U.S.-Israel FTA in 1985” (Deltas et 
al., 2012, 942).
The hub-and-spoke structure has been popular in theories of international trade, also. For example, 
Krugman (1993a) found that “[i]f one of the three regions has better access to the other two regions 
than they have to each other, this superior access can lead to concentration of production in the in-
creasing returns sector” (Krugman, 1993a, 34). In the new-new trade theory, Melitz and Ottaviano 
(2008) showed that firms in a hub of the hub-and-spoke structure can gain a better access to the other 
markets and, as a result, their average costs, prices, and mark-ups will go down more significantly than 
firms in the other two countries (spokes) (Melitz & Ottaviano, 2008, 310–2).
The proliferation of PTAs in the end of the 20th-century reignited interest in network position as 
a source of competitive advantage in international relations. It did not take long before policy-makers 
in industrialized countries caught onto this idea; it was competitive advantage gains from an important 
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position in PTA networks that convinced South Korea's left-leaning President Roh Moo-Hyun to decide to 
make “dongsidabal” (concurrent) PTAs with advanced economies his foreign economic policy objective.
Accelerated by the Korea-US FTA, FTAs with the EU, Canada, ASEAN, Japan, China, 
and India will enable Korea to achieve the Northeast Asian economic hub, which serves 
as a link between the world’s major economic powers. We have concluded an FTA with 
the United States in Northeast Asia for the first time, thus laying the groundwork for be-
coming a hub of the global market, …, further solidifying our position in Northeast Asia” 
(Presidential Advisory Policy Committee, 2008, 37, emphasis added).
Similarly, the Advisory Council on Economic Growth of Canada urged the Canadian government to 
pursue “new, preferential trade arrangements with large and fast-growing nations, especially in Asia, and 
more specifically with China, Japan and India” in order to “become a global trading hub and a nexus for 
global supply chains” (Advisory Council on Economic Growth, 2017, 2).
Despite the popularity of becoming a hub in policy dialogues and academic discussions as a source 
of competitive advantage in international trade, the concept remains highly elusive. First, what is a 
hub? In policy dialogues, it sometimes means just a country with many PTA partners or the center of 
a regional/global trade network. Academic discussions of hubs in trade relations are not much clearer 
than policy dialogues. The hub-and-spoke structure is such an unrealistic model that it cannot be di-
rectly applied to today's dense PTA networks. As of 2019, all WTO members have at least one PTA 
partner. 91% of WTO members successfully avoid being a “spoke” by holding more than two PTA 
partners, and the average number of PTA for WTO members is as large as 13.1
Second, the narrow definition of a hub in the hub-and-spoke system is not proper to discuss the 
competitive advantage of a hub, if any, due to its short-lived nature. The cost of forming a PTA is not 
so prohibitively large that spoke countries can easily connect themselves with unconnected countries 
to overcome competitive disadvantage. This microlevel incentive generates a network phenomenon 
called triadic closure, which was reported to have played some role in the formation of the PTA net-
work (Manger, Pickup, & Snijders, 2012).
As such, we need a clear definition of positional advantage or “hub” status in PTA networks be-
yond THE hub-and-spoke structure.
3 |  HUB IN PTA NETWORKS
3.1 | Node Importance in PTA Networks
Identifying a central actor is key to understanding the structure of social relations. In the network literature, 
there are three different major approaches to identifying important actors: (a) ego-centric (local level), (b) 
distance-based (global level), and (c) neighbor-based (mesolevel) (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, 169–221).
An ego-centric approach evaluates the relative importance of actors by the number of ties they 
have. In the context of PTA networks, a country that has more PTA partners than others will be 
considered more important. Although simplistic and succinct, the ego-centric ignores higher-level 
information at the group or global level. For example, the ego-centric approach fails to distinguish a 
1 The numbers are computed using the WTO RTA dataset (https ://www.wto.org/engli sh/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm, 
accessed on August 8, 2019).
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country within a trilateral PTA (all countries have degree 2 including the ego) and a hub country in the 
hub-and-spoke structure (the hub has degree 2 and spoke countries have degree 1).
In a global-level approach, node importance is measured by the actor's contribution to global network 
properties such as the average distance in the entire network.2 The distance-based centrality measures (i.e. 
betweenness centrality) capture node importance well when edges are transferable. For example, when 
social ties reflect the flow of information such as news, gossip, and innovative technology, the dis-
tance-based centrality measures show who plays an important role in the dissemination of information 
(Burt, 2001); Granovetter, 1978). However, PTAs have exclusive rules of origin (ROOs) that do not apply 
beyond signatories. Recently, Conconi, García-Santana, Puccio, and Venturini (2018) showed that PTA’s 
exclusive rules of origin have significant trade-diverting effects. Thus, the assumption of edge transferabil-
ity embedded in a global-level node importance approach is problematic in the analysis of PTA networks.
In contrast to the above two approaches, a mesolevel (or group-level) approach focuses not only on the 
importance on the ego, but also on the importance of the ego's directly connected neighbors. Thus, unlike 
the ego or global-level approach, a mesolevel approach to node importance has several important features 
that capture the distinct nature of PTA networks. First, a mesolevel approach captures the short-ranged 
edge transferability in PTA networks better than a global-level approach. Countries in the same continent 
form regional PTAs to share the benefits of exclusive ROOs, or proximate countries form a series of bilat-
eral PTAs to exploit regional production networks. Second, a mesolevel approach effectively shows the 
power and influence of social actors in social relations. The idea that important nodes in a network can be 
identified by the importance of its partners is well established in network literature (Bonacich, 1987; Burt, 
2010; Katz, 1953). Recently, this idea became highly popularized by web ranking algorithms such as 
PageRank (Brin & Page, 1998) and Hyperlink-Induced Topic Search (HITS) algorithm (Kleinberg, 1998). 
Third, a mesolevel approach can be connected with the strategic aspect of PTA formation. Ballester, 
Calvo-Armengol, and Zenou (2006) show that a network game with individual, global, and network ef-
fects has a unique Nash equilibrium that is proportional to the eigenvector centrality. As we will explain 
below in detail, the eigenvector centrality is a core measure of node importance at the mesolevel.3
2 The distance between a pair of actors in a network is represented as a path. A path ψ between actor i and actor j is ψij = {i, k, 
h,j} where k and h together are a set of actors needed to travel from i to j. The shortest path between two actors then is a path 
that contains the smallest number of actors. Centrality scores of an actor based on distance in a network take into account all 
shortest paths where the given actor is included.
3 Suppose that country i's utility depends on a PTA tie of its own (xi) and of others (x–i) in the following linear-quadratic form:
where σii < 0 indicating the diminishing marginal utility of PTAs and σij is a cross-effect of i's PTA with j's PTA on i's 
utility. Then, a N × N matrix of cross-effects Σ can be decomposed into a combination of an idiosyncratic effect, a global 
interaction:
which gives.
(Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2006, 1405–6). If each country maximizes this utility given others’ actions in the 
same way, the aggregate equilibrium outcome is consistent with the Bonacich centrality (Bonacich, 1972), which is a variant 
of the eigenvector centrality. When we assume that node influence does not travel beyond direct links (i.e. the decay 
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3.2 | How PTA networks affect GVCs?
In GVCs, the price of final goods could entail a process of combining multiple inputs that traverse 
different countries. Since tariffs are applied to gross imports, each step at which an input crosses 
border adds an extra cost to the price of final goods. While fragmenting production stages allow 
firms to benefit from locally abundant factors, those gains can be offset by the incremental nature of 
tariff accumulation in GVCs (the magnification effect). Thus, firms have a strong interest in locating 
their production networks where magnification effects can be minimized. Since production networks 
generally include more than two countries, (according to Wang et al. (2017)’s estimate, two to seven 
countries are typically involved in a production network), PTAs covering a large number of countries 
are preferred. More precisely, it would be important for offshoring firms to find a subset of countries 
interconnected by PTAs. From the perspective of a country, this suggests that having well-connected 
neighbors in a PTA network will increase the chance that firms will include the given country in their 
production networks. This leads to our first implication:
Implication 1 Countries with well-connected neighbors in PTA networks are less exposed to magni-
fication effect and thus more likely to be involved in firms’ production networks than countries 
without well-connected neighbors.
However, PTAs are not just about reducing tariffs. PTAs have become increasingly heterogeneous 
in terms of issue coverage. PTAs now cover a range of behind-the-border issues such as foreign in-
vestment, intellectual property rights, service sector liberalization, standards, competition policy, and 
public procurement (Baldwin, 2013, 2016; Orefice & Rocha, 2014; Osnago, Rocha, & Ruta, 2015). 
Policy issues “that were previously dealt with under dedicated bilateral instruments, such as bilateral 
investment treaties, customs cooperation agreements, and cooperation on competition policy, are now 
increasingly incorporated into PTAs” (Chauffour & Maur, 2011, 29).
Scholars of international political economy have noted that PTA heterogeneity plays an im-
portant role in firms’ investment decisions (Antràs & Staiger, 2012; Baldwin, 2016; Chase, 2009; 
Kim, Milner, et al., 2019; Kim, Lee, et al., 2019; Orefice & Rocha, 2014; Osgood, 2018). Large 
firms with sufficient export capabilities have a vested interest in offshoring, allowing them to ex-
ploit advantages such as lower factor prices and more favorable locations. One critical issue these 
firms face is the time-inconsistency problem (or the hold-up problem): A country's commitment 
to foreign investment may not be credible after the investment is executed. The possibility of 
unilateral expropriation by a host country calls for “deep” PTAs that encompass non-traditional 
trade issues including intellectual property rights, investment protection, and dispute settlement 
mechanisms (Antràs & Staiger, 2012; Orefice & Rocha, 2014). Kim, Milner, et al. (2019) showed 
that protection from the expropriation of investment assets by host countries was one of the most 
critical elements of a trade agreement from a firm's perspective. Büthe and Milner (2008), Kim, 
Lee, et al. (2019) and Kim, Milner, et al. (2019) also found that PTAs incorporating investment 
clauses and dispute settlement mechanisms provide credibility to host countries’ commitments. 
Other policy areas in deep PTAs such as labor and environmental regulations and harmonization 
of production standards reduce coordination costs and provide investment-seeking firms a better 
policy space in which to operate. Policy changes triggered by deep PTAs are less likely to be re-
versed, motivating firms to make investments in a country where such policy coordination is guar-
anteed. Thus, deeper economic integration and stronger investment protection along production 
networks indicate that a country with PTA partners with a strong preference for deep agreements, 
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which we call “deep-PTA neighbors,” is likely to accumulate larger benefits than a country with-
out deep-PTA neighbors.
Implication 2 Countries with deep-PTA neighbors encourage more investment by foreign firms than 
countries without deep-PTA neighbors.
Furthermore, scholars of international political economy have pointed out that countries form trade 
agreements to tie their hands or to send a credible signal of policy consistency to domestic and in-
ternational audiences (Büthe & Milner, 2008; Mansfield & Milner, 2012; Whalley, 1998). It was 
also maintained that countries opt for trade agreements to buy insurance against possible trade wars, 
thereby reducing policy uncertainty and institutionalizing the dispute settlement process (Handley & 
Limão, 2017). The main problem with these arguments from our perspective is that they are monadic 
predictions, ignoring the network aspect of trade agreements. First, if we consider PTAs as a dyadic 
process, we should expect that the value of PTA as a commitment or signaling device varies depend-
ing on who the partner is. Second, PTAs are more than a dyadic process. Numerous regional or mega 
bloc PTAs have been proposed and bilateral and multilateral PTAs have significant externalities to 
non-participating countries. Thus, we also need to consider who the partners of their partners are. This 
network perspective provides an important refinement to the existing theories of PTA as a commit-
ment or signaling device.
Implication 3 Forming “deep” trade agreements with well-connected, deep-PTA neighbors makes 
a country’s commitment to policy consistency and investment protection more credible than 
forming shallow PTAs with peripheral and shallow-agreement seeking PTA neighbors.
Unfortunately, these three theoretical implications are not directly testable because the relevant 
data—cross-border cumulative tariffs, firms’ investment decisions, and the credibility of a country's 
commitment—are either unobserved or hard to measure. Instead, we derive two empirically testable 
hypotheses from the above theoretical implications. First, we can test our argument by comparing 
changes in a country's PTA hub status and changes in its value-added export.
Hypothesis 1 Countries with well-connected, deep-PTA neighbors grow faster within GVCs than 
countries without well-connected, deep-PTA neighbors.
As will be clear shortly, value-added exports in GVCs can be further disaggregated at the industry 
level. Industry-level analysis allows us to investigate the distributional effects of a country's network 
position across industries. As Stolper and Samuelson (1941) and Rogowski (1989) clearly showed, all 
factors that affect the price of goods have distributional effects. Given low interindustry factor mo-
bility in industrialized countries (Hiscox, 2002), we expect a positive change in a country's network 
position to lead to the reallocation of resources in favor of industries that deeply engaged in global 
production networks (high use of intermediate goods), at the cost of industries that are not embedded 
in global production networks (little use of intermediate goods).
Hypothesis 2 Industries that deeply engage in global production networks will grow faster if 
they are located within a country with well-connected, deep-PTA neighbors than industries that 
are not embedded in the global production networks.
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3.3 | An Illustration: PTA networks in the Asia–pacific region
Before we move to the discussion of our empirical tests, it is helpful to illustrate how mesolevel node 
importance works in reality. Figure 1 visualizes the evolution of PTA networks in the Asia–Pacific 
region from 2000 to 2014. We chose the Asia–Pacific region because countries in this region recently 
experienced dramatic changes in their PTA ties. After two regional trade agreements (RTAs) were 
formed in 1992, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA), countries in this region competitively signed a series of bilateral PTAs. One observer 
called the proliferation of PTAs in this region a “spaghetti bowl” (Baldwin, 2006).
For easy interpretation, we drop countries without PTA ties with other countries in the region. 
Countries are nodes and edges are drawn if there is a signed PTA between a pair of countries. The size 
of nodes is proportional to our measure of node importance, which we call a PTA hub score.4 A bright 
red color indicates a high PTA hub score and a dark color indicates a low PTA hub score. To save 
space, we show three snapshots of the evolution: 2000, 2007, and 2014. A brief network characteristic 
is annotated at the bottom of each panel.
The left panel of Figure 1 shows the PTA network in 2000. The network was divided by the 
two regional PTAs: the NAFTA and the AFTA. In the language of Burt (2009), a “structural hole” 
(separation between nonredundant contacts) existed in this region's PTA network in 2000. There 
existed room for gains (brokerage benefits) by connecting disconnected RTAs. The central panel 
shows that “connecting disconnected RTAs” is exactly what countries in this region have done since 
2000. Seven years later, the two RTA blocs were merged into one bloc by PTAs between several 
countries. Among those countries bridging two blocs, Chile (CHL) stands out as the most important 
node in 2007. Mexico (MEX), South Korea (KOR), and Singapore (SGP) closely follow Chile in 
importance.
The right panel shows the Asia–Pacific PTA network as of 2014. One of the most surprising results 
is the rise of South Korea, which now competes with Chile as a regional PTA hub. South Korea's rise 
as a PTA hub was largely driven by the successive deep PTAs South Korea formed with important 
players in global PTA networks such as the AFTA, Canada, Chile, EU, and the United States. Note 
that most of South Korea's PTA partners are well-connected countries with a strong preference for 
4 PTA hub scores are computed using the entire countries in WTO RTA dataset (https ://www.wto.org/engli sh/tratop_e/
region_e/region_e.htm). The measurement method will be explained in the next section.
F I G U R E  1  PTA hub status changes in the Asia–Pacific Region: The size of nodes is adjusted by PTA hub 
scores. Bright red colors indicate high PTA hub scores, and dark colors indicate low PTA hub scores [Colour figure 









(a) Two Blocs in 2000

















(b) Rise of Chile in 2007
Chile (CHL) rose as an important hub of PTA network connecting both 

















(c) Rise of South Korea in 2014
South Korea (KOR) became a new hub of the Asia−Pacific by forming 
 new PTAs with the U.S., Canada, Australia, and the ASEAN countries.
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deep PTAs. By forming a series of deep PTAs with these deep-PTA neighbors, South Korea was able 
to rise as a prominent PTA hub in this region.
If our theory is correct, we should observe stronger trade performance in the countries with high 
PTA hub status (e.g. Chile, South Korea, the United States, Mexico, Canada, and Singapore), holding 
other factors constant. In particular, the trade performance of rising PTA hub countries such as South 
Korea should improve significantly compared to countries without large improvements in their PTA 
hub status.
4 |  DATA AND METHOD
In this section, we explain our empirical strategy for estimating PTA hub effects. We first discuss the 
construction of the dependent variable using the input–output tables of bilateral trade flows. Next, 
we discuss the measurement of PTA hub scores using PTA data. Finally, we explain our statistical 
method for estimating PTA hub effects on value-added exports in GVCs.
4.1 | Dependent variable: Value-added exports
To measure countries’ value-added contributions within GVCs, we use the method developed by 
Wang et al. (2018). As an input dataset for WWZ decomposition, we use World Input-output Dataset 
(WIOD) collected by Timmer et al. (2015) and updated later by Timmer et al. (2016). The WIOD 
encompass the sector-level input–output trade data of 43 major economies from 2000 to 2014. It cov-
ers 3 categories (primary, manufacturing, service) of 56 industrial sectors, including fishing, mining, 
manufacturing of machines, manufacturing of textiles and financial service activities.5
The WWZ decomposition dissects trade flows into four different dimensions: Domestic Value 
Added (DVA), Returned Domestic Value (RDV), Foreign Value Added (FVA), and Pure Double Count 
(PDC). Among the four dimensions, we use DVA and FTA as our dependent variables because they 
show each country's value-added contribution in GVCs than RDV and PDC.6 DVA and FVA capture 
two different aspects of value-added contributions. DVA includes all value additions in the exports of 
final and intermediate goods originated by domestic industries that are absorbed abroad. FVA mea-
sures the contribution by domestic industries to the value-added chain initiated by a foreign industry 
that are absorbed in either domestic or foreign country. For example, a memory chip in an iPhone is 
manufactured by TSMC in Taiwan and SK Hynix in Korea, which are then imported by China as in-
termediate goods, assembled into iPhones, and exported as a final good. In the case of iPhones, FVA 
captures the amount of value addition of foreign origin in China's exports.
5 The dimension of the data matrix WIOD is 2,408 × 2,408 × 15. The first two dimensions represent the number of country–
industry pairs (43 × 54) and the third the time (years 2000 to 2014). Wang, Wei and Zhu (2018) decompose the input–output 
matrix into a country-level dataset with four categories. While the discussion of the decomposition is important, it contains 
many technical issues that are not directly related with the main goal of this paper. For more information, refer to Wang, Wei 
and Zhu (2018), Quast and (Kummritz2015) and Timmer et al. (2016).
6 Returned Domestic Value measures the flows of value-added that originated from home country but eventually return to 
home country as final goods imports. Pure Double Count measures value-added flows that are counted more than once 
because the flow comes in and out of home country repeatedly. We exclude them from our analysis for consistency and better 
interpretability. RDV measures value-addition embedded within final goods imports which is a small segment compared to 
what DVA and FVA measures and may not as easily be categorized as “export strength.” PDC is by definition a residual 
category rather than a measure of trade capability.
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Then, we calculate weighted out-strength degrees of value-added exports (Barrat, Barthelemy, & 
Vespignani, 2007). The out-strength degree of country i is defined as.
where bij is the binary indicator of trade flow between countries i and j, and wij denotes the volume of 
value-added flow from country i to country j. Out-strength degree si measures both intensive and exten-
sive margins in value-added exports. That is, an increase in si indicates either that country i increases its 
value-added exports to existing partners, or that country i's value-added exports have a new destination (a 
new trade partner).
4.2 | Explanatory variable: PTA hub score
Let A = (V, E) be a PTA network with a country set V = {v1, v2,..., vn} and an edge set E ⊆ V × V, 
where aij is an ith row and jth column element of A, which is d > 0 if country i and country j have a 
PTA with d-level depth and 0 if they do not any PTA. Then, we can define an importance of an actor 
i (vi) as a recursively additive function of all the directly connected nodes and their PTA depth as 
follows:
That is, node importance of an actor at the mesolevel is a scaled average of its own and its neigh-
bors’ importance. Suppose two countries with the same number of PTA partners. We can rewrite 
Equation (4) using an adjacency matrix A and a vector of centrality scores c:
Then, c is an eigenvector of A corresponding to eigenvalue λ. Since A is non-negative, the Perron–
Frobenius theorem guarantees that λ is the largest eigenvalue and c is its unique corresponding eigen-
vector, containing eigenvector centrality scores for each node.7
To account for PTA heterogeneity, we use the Design of Trade Agreements measure (DESTA) 
(Dür et al., 2014), which counts the number of behind-the-border measures a PTA covers. The key 
provisions of behind-the-border measures are unconditional tariff reductions in goods, service sec-
tor liberalization, investment protection, standards, public procurement, competition, and intellectual 
property rights. The depth of the PTA is measured according to a scale of how many of these provi-
sions are contained within the PTA. For example, a PTA of depth 5 contains five of the above seven 





























7 The Perron–Frobenius theorem states that for a non-negative symmetric matrix, there is an eigenvector with positive real 
coordinates corresponding to the largest eigenvalue and the eigenvector is unique up to constant multiplication. See Easley 
and Kleinberg (2010, 376) and Newman (2016, 5).
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4.3 | Control variables
We include a comprehensive list of control variables to control for omitted variable bias. For this, we 
collect 21 input variables that may affect a country's value-added exports independent of a country's 
PTA hub status. Our goal is to isolate the effect of a country's PTA hub status, holding ego or global-
level node importance constant. Thus, we need to control for factors related with the ego-level and the 
global-level node importance.
First, we include a list of measures reflecting ego-level network effects. A country's value-added 
exports might be affected simply by the sheer number of PTA partners it has (ego centrality), which 
contradicts our theory based on the importance of neighbors and PTA depth. Another possible con-
founder is the number of PTAs at each depth level (ego centrality0, …, ego centrality7). For example, 
a country's trade performance can be affected by the number of deepest PTAs (depth 7) independent 
of its neighbor network. If we omit the depth-specific PTA numbers a country has and any of these 
variables has a positive effect on value-added exports, the estimated PTA hub would be overstated.
Second, we control for network effects at the global level using betweenness centrality scores 
(Freeman, 1977, 1978), closeness centrality, and participation coefficient (Guimera & Amaral, 2005). 
The first two centrality measures are well-known distance-based centrality scores. The participation 
coefficient is less well known and it might be important because it measures node importance at the 
global level whiling taking into account bloc structures. A high participation coefficient indicates that 
node i is connecting multiple blocs, whereas a low participation coefficient indicates that node i is 
exclusively participating in its own bloc. Thus, if the economy of a country connecting multiple blocs 
of PTAs grows fast, participation will have a positive sign.
Third, we control for the growing size of PTA networks over time by including the total number of 
PTAs (PTA Number).
Fourth, we include several political and economic variables that might affect a country's val-
ue-added exports: the size of economy (log-transformed population, land, and log trans- formed gross 
domestic product (GDP), the level of economic development (log-transformed gross domestic product 
per capita GDP per capita), the (log-transformed) net inflow of FDI, polity scores (Polity), the degree 
of capital account openness (the Chinn-Ito index, MarketOpen) (Chinn & Ito, 2006), a dummy vari-
able for EU members, and a linear time trend.




4.4 | Statistical method
In studying the effect of a PTA on trade, scholars have long warned of the issue of selection bias 
(Baier & Bergstrand, 2007; Baier et al., 2019; Egger, Egger, & Greenaway, 2008). That is, countries 
self-select into a PTA when they expect trade gains from it; otherwise, they do not bother to negotiate 
a PTA. This non-random formation process poses an important challenge in estimating PTA effects 
on trade. To overcome selection bias, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) use a panel approach to resolve 
selection bias and Egger et al. (2008) and Baier and Bergstrand (2009) use a matching method to 
reduce imbalance in the sample and apply a panel method to estimate the PTA effect on trade flows.
However, our empirical goal is different from previous studies in several ways. First, the goal of 
previous studies was to estimate the average effect of a PTA on bilateral trade flows. Hence, the unit 
of analysis is a dyad. In contrast, the unit of analysis in our empirical design is a country. Our goal is 
to estimate the effect of a country’s PTA hub status on a country’s value-added exports. Selection bias 
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in our design takes a different form; countries expecting trade gains from PTAs are more likely to form 
PTAs than others. We need to control for country-specific confounders that affect trade gains from 
PTAs and the formation of PTAs at the same time. If we consider those country-specific confounders 
to be time-constant, conventional panel methods such as the fixed-effects method can be used to min-
imize the bias. For time-varying confounders, we have to use observed covariates to account for their 
effects on the dependent variable. Second, our dependent variable is different from the ones used by 
previous studies. Decomposed value-added export data is a more valid measure of a country’s trade 
performance than bilateral trade data, in which a country’s value-added contributions are conflated 
with value-added contributions by other countries producing intermediate goods. Third, a country’s 
PTA hub status is more exogenous to a country’s decision to form a PTA than the binary measure of 
a PTA between a pair of countries. A simple reason is that a country’s PTA hub status is a scaled av-
erage of its own and its neighbors’ importance in PTA networks. A country can choose popular PTA 
partners, but it is difficult to control partners’ future connections. Thus, if we control for the degree 
centrality of the country in the model, we can separate the effects of neighbor network from the effects 
of the country’s own connections.
A more important empirical concern than selection bias in our design is omitted variable bias 
coming from the homophilous nature of PTAs. Countries with similar characteristics are likely to form 
dense blocks in PTA networks and also engage deeply in GVCs with each other. If we omit background 
variables that influence them to flock together in PTA networks and trade heavily, we may overesti-
mate the effects of PTA hub status. In order to address the endogeneity coming from the homophilous 
nature of PTAs, we use the machine-learning based panel two-stage regression approach, known as 
the sample-splitting and cross-fitting panel DML method (Belloni et al., 2014; Chernozhukov et al., 
2017; Semenova et al., 2018). We discuss our implementation of the DML method in the Appendix 1.
Another empirical concern in our design is reverse causality. That is, a country's trade performance 
within GVCs may affect the popularity of its own and its neighbor network, not vice versa. PTA net-
works are recorded when they are finally signed, however, to avoid the reverse causality, we lag all the 
PTA-related covariates by two years. This is because according to Moser and Rose (2012), on average, 
it takes two years for a signed PTA to actually enter into force. Therefore, we need to match the re-
sponse variable at t with PTA-related covariates at t − 2 to estimate PTA effects.8
5 |  RESULTS
5.1 | Results of the fixed-effect models
Table 1 summarizes the results of the fixed-effect analysis. In order to check the robustness of our 
results, we employ four different panel treatments to deal with various sources of endogeneity. The 
first two models employ a one-way fixed-effect model at the country level, which produces within 
estimates of PTA hub status. That is, the first two models show how the within-country variation of 
PTA hub status affects each country's value-added exports over time, controlling for all the average 
differences between the dependent variable and independent variables. The within estimates clearly 
show that PTA hub has a positive and statistically significant effects on value-added exports in DVA 
and FVA, which is consistent with hypothesis 1.
8 Although the timing of PTA effects is beyond the scope of our paper, we note that the effects of PTAs may precede the date 
of signature because there may be some preemptive responses from consumers and producers in advance to the formation of a 
PTA. Or, some PTAs have lagged effects due to the uncertainties around ratification and implementation stages in a 
participating country.
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The next two models ((3)-(4)) show estimates from the two-way fixed effects at the country and 
year levels. Now, we further control for year-specific effects that may confound our analysis. For 
example, the global financial crisis and trade disputes between major exporters may affect countries’ 
value-added exports independently of their PTA hub status. Also, the signing of mega bloc PTAs may 
increase hub status of related countries (members and their neighbors) and decrease that of non-re-
lated countries. Controlling for these year-specific factors do not substantively affect the findings; 
coefficients of PTA hub remain positive and statistically significant.
Aside from within-country variations, hypothesis 1 also implies that PTA hub status must have a 
positive effect across countries. The first four models cannot properly address cross-country variations 
between PTA hub status and the dependent variables, because of the within transformation to remove 
unobserved time-constant country-level factors. To test hypothesis 1 across countries, we compute the 
between estimator of PTA hub status, which is reported in column (5) and (6). Surprisingly, the effect 
size increases dramatically, implying that country-level differences in PTA hub status explain a lot of 
the variation in value-added exports, controlling for major covariates of export strength.
Last, we need to consider possible bias coming from serial correlation in the error of our models. 
As our data have long time series for each country, we fit a first-differenced model to see whether 
annual changes in PTA hub status affects annual changes in value-added exports, controlling for major 
covariates of export strength. However, it should be stressed that estimates from the first-difference 
models are sensitive to measurement error, which could be a not so trivial concern in our case because 
our causal variable (PTA hub score) is not directly observed but a construction from observed data. 
With that in mind, columns (7) and (8) show that marginal changes in our causal variable are posi-
tively and significantly associated with marginal changes in value-added exports, which is consistent 
with hypothesis 1.
Statistical significance does not necessarily imply substantively significance. To gauge the sub-
stantive importance of our findings, we compute the predicted effects of PTA hub scores on val-
ue-added exports. We use a country fixed-effect model reported in columns (1) and (2) in Table 1. 
After setting all control variables at their means, we vary the size of the causal variable from minimum 
to maximum. The predicted means and intervals are displayed in Figure 2.
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The left panel of Figure 2 shows that a change in the PTA hub score from minimum to maximum 
produces a half standard deviation increase in DVA. The right panel shows a similar level of change 
in FVA. In other words, holding all the other covariates constant, by changing a country’s PTA hub 
status from minimum to maximum, its value-added exports can increase by a half standard deviation 
of the average of value-added exports. In the case of a small open economy with a mid-level PTA hub 
status, and having a quarter of the global average value-added export, our prediction results tell us that 
if the country improves its PTA hub status to the highest level its value-added exports in DVA and 
FVA can be doubled.
5.2 | Results of the sample-splitting and cross-fitting DML method
The above findings from the fixed-effects models are highly consistent with our theoretical hypoth-
esis. However, one important assumption that we could not check in the previous analysis is whether 
our statistical control using a few observed covariates provides a sufficient condition for ceteris pari-
bus. Although we implemented a suite of different model specifications, some of which are reported 
in the Appendix S1, there is a room for bias coming from model selection mistakes, model misspeci-
fications, and omission of higher order interactions.
One thing we can do to improve our inference is to estimate a consistent coefficient of our causal 
variable that is orthogonal or immune to possible model selection mistakes or misspecifications in 
“nuisance” parts, which is why we employ the sample-splitting and cross-fitting panel DML method 
(Belloni et al., 2014, 34). For variable selection and parameter regularization within the DML method, 
we use the adaptive lasso method (Zou, 2006), which shows a better performance than the lasso method 
(Tibshirani, 1996). We also include 210 pairwise interaction terms of the observed control variables, 
which leads to 232 predictors in total, to account for higher order interactions between control variables.
Table 2 summarizes the results of the sample-splitting and cross-fitting DML analysis at the coun-
try level. We report three estimates of PTA hub effects: the one-step OLS estimate, the two-step 
orthogonal estimate, and the sample-splitting and cross-fitting DML estimate. Naive DML results 
show regularized coefficients after dividing covariates into the causal variable and nuisance variables, 
without sample-splitting and cross-fitting. Naive DML produces much larger estimates of PTA hub 
effects than the fixed-effects estimates. Semenova et al. (2018) discuss that Naive DML estimates can 
be biased due to correlations within group residuals. To remove this bias, Chernozhukov et al. (2017) 
and Semenova et al. (2018) suggest the sample-splitting and cross-fitting method, which is reported 
T A B L E  2  Estimates of PTA Hub Effects: The dependent variables are DVA and FVA out-strengths. Naive 
DML indicates a naive DML estimation method without sample-splitting and cross-fitting. Cross-fitting DML 
indicates the sample-splitting and cross-fitting panel DML estimation (Semenova et al., 2018). Clustered standard 
errors are reported in SE
Fixed effects Method
Estimates
DVA SE FVA SE
Country (Detrended) (1) OLS (one-step estimation) 0.04 0.14 0.17 0.22
(2) Naive DML (orthogonal 
estimation)
0.24 0.07 0.43 0.11
(3) Cross-fitting DML (sample 
splitting and orthogonal 
estimation)
0.13 0.06 0.21 0.12
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in row (3) in Table 2. The sample-splitting and cross-fitting DML method produces estimates similar 
to those of the fixed-effect methods. The coefficient of the PTA hub score is positive and significant, 
which is consistent with previous findings and Hypothesis 1: An increase in a country's PTA hub score 
is associated with an increase in the country's value-added exports in DVA and FVA.
5.3 | Industry-level test
The country-level results are largely consistent with hypothesis 1 that an improvement in a country's 
PTA hub status leads to an increase in a country's value-added exports. Now we check our second 
F I G U R E  3  Industry-level cross-fitting DML Analysis for DVA: The size of dots is adjusted to be proportional 
to the export share of each industry. Red colors indicate positive effects and blue colors indicate negative effects. 
Gray colors indicate vague effects including 0 at the conventional significance level [Colour figure can be viewed at 
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities
Real estate activities
Legal and accounting activities
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Human health and social work activities
Other service activities
Activities of households
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hypothesis: Industries using many intermediate goods will grow faster if they are located within a 
country with well-connected, deep-PTA neighbors than industries using fewer intermediate goods.
We apply the most reliable method (the sample-splitting and cross-fitting DML method with the 
adaptive lasso regularization method) from our country-level tests to industry-level data. The total 
number of industries is 55, and hence, we repeat the same analysis 55 times by changing the indus-
try-level dependent variables while the right hand-side variables are held constant. Industry-specific 
fixed effects are included to account for idiosyncratic factors in each industry.
We visualize industry-specific PTA hub effects as dot plots in Figures 3 and 4. The size of dot 
is adjusted to be proportional to the export share of each industry. Thus, larger dots indicate indus-
tries with larger export shares in GVCs. The color of dots indicates the direction of the effects: Red 
F I G U R E  4  Industry-level Cross-fitting DML Analysis for FVA: The size of dots is adjusted to be proportional 
to the export share of each industry. Red colors indicate positive effects and blue colors indicate negative effects. 
Gray colors indicate vague effects including 0 at the conventional significance level [Colour figure can be viewed at 
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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indicates a positive effect and blue indicates a negative effect. Effects that are not different from zero 
at the conventional level are displayed as gray dots.
Figures 3 and 4 show that an enhancement in PTA hub status mostly benefits manufacturing sec-
tors. One of the most important beneficiaries is the manufacture of computers. Note that computer 
manufacturers have the largest industry share in GVCs. Manufacture of electrical equipment, man-
ufacture of fabricated metal products, and manufacture of wood and of products made of wood and 
cork closely follow the manufacture of computer. Roughly speaking, these four manufacturing sectors 
drive the positive PTA hub effects. These results are consistent with hypothesis 2. The cross-border 
diffusion of production stages is driven by manufacturing sectors that are heavily involved in intrain-
dustry trade and information technology (Baldwin, 2013; Elms & Low, 2013; Koopman, Wang, & 
Wei, 2014). These four manufacturing sectors are key examples of advanced and highly fragmented 
manufacturing sectors.
Among service sectors, financial service activities, motion pictures, and air transport gain from 
an enhancement in PTA hub status, while other service sectors such as education, postal and courier 
activities, and sewerage waste collection suffer from changes brought by stronger PTA hub status. 
Again, these findings are consistent with hypothesis 2. Financial service activities, motion pictures, 
and air transport are examples of dynamic or knowledge-intensive service sectors that have a capac-
ity to take advantage of better foreign market access, fast changes in people's tastes, and increased 
product variety in competition (Wren, Fodor, & Theodoropoulou, 2013). In contrast, traditional and 
public service sectors do not have a similar capacity to fully take advantage of economic opportunities 
provided by PTA hub position. As a result, PTA hub position accelerates the reallocation of economic 
resources from traditional and public service sectors to knowledge-intensive service sectors.
Overall, we found that PTA hub position facilitates reallocation of economic resources into the 
manufacturing and service sectors, which can reap major benefits from economic opportunities 
provided by PTA hub position of their home countries. In contrast, PTA hub position hurts static 
F I G U R E  5  Naive DML Estimates of Year-by-year PTA Hub Effects: The estimation method is the naive DML 
using the adaptive lasso method. The number of observations is 36, with 209 predictors (19 main predictors and 190 
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economic sectors that are unable to take full advantage of better foreign market access, faster changes 
in people's tastes, and more product variety.
6 |  ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
It is important to check over-time variations because PTA hub effects may be short-term or transient 
phenomena that exist only when the size of PTA network was relatively small, and decrease system-
atically as the PTA network expands. If so, PTA hub effects may only be a matter of the past.9 In order 
to estimate year-by-year PTA hub effects, we cannot use the sample-splitting and cross-fitting method 
because the year index was used to split the sample. Instead, we use the DML method without sample-
splitting and cross-fitting (naive DML) using the adaptive lasso method for parameter regularization. 
We also drop a linear trend variable and year-fixed effects, and hence, coefficients are not directly 
comparable with the previous estimates.
Figure 5 shows yearly (naive DML) estimates of PTA hub effects. While yearly estimates vary 
quite a lot over time, the point estimates of PTA hub effects remain positive except for a single case 
(namely, the case of DVA in 2004). One interesting pattern in the yearly estimates is the greater 
variance in the PTA hub effect during the period between 2008 and 2011, which is associated with 
the collapse of global trade due to the financial crisis. According to the European Central Bank, “[b]
etween the third quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009 global trade volumes declined by 
approximately 15% and, thus, much more steeply than world GDP, which fell by around 2% over the 
same period” (European Central Bank, 2010, 16). Since 2012, as global trade started to slowly recover 
from the financial crisis, the PTA hub effect has increased. There is no sign of diminishing PTA hub 
effects over time; that is, the competitive advantages of strong PTA hub status remain solid before and 
after the financial crisis.
Next, we check whether our findings substantively change if we drop other PTA-related predictors 
from the analysis. The intuition behind this check is that PTA hub effects might be correlated with 
other PTA-related predictors in unknown ways, and that the estimated PTA hub effects could be 
sensitive to the inclusion and exclusion of other PTA-related predictors. After dropping all the other 
9 Note that we detrended our original model using a linear trend variable to avoid a spurious time-series regression problem 
(Granger and Newbold, 1974).
T A B L E  3  Estimates of PTA Hub Effects without Other PTA-related Controls: Other PTA-related predictors 
except the PTA hub score are dropped. The dependent variables are DVA and FVA out-strengths. Naive DML 
indicates a naive DML estimation method without sample-splitting and cross-fitting. Cross-fitting DML indicates 




DVA SE FVA SE
Country (Detrended) (4) OLS (one-step estimation) 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.03
(5) Naive DML (orthogonal 
estimation)
0.09 0.02 0.15 0.03
(6) Cross-fitting DML (sample 
splitting and orthogonal 
estimation)
0.08 0.02 0.13 0.03
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PTA-related predictors, the reduced model has 35 predictors in total. Table 3 shows the results of the 
reduced model analysis. Although the magnitudes of effects shrink in comparison with the original 
model, PTA hub effects are still positive and non-zero in all cases. Note that standard errors in Table 3 
are much smaller than standard errors in Table 2, indicating that the lack of statistical control of other 
PTA-related predictors produces overly confident estimates.
As a placebo test, we check the sensitivity of the sample-splitting and cross-fitting DML estimation 
method by replacing PTA hub with other measures of node importance (degree, betweenness, and 
closeness). The intuition behind this placebo check is to see whether other measures of node impor-
tance might have similar signs when they are treated as a proper measure of node importance in PTA 
networks. The estimation method is identical to the one used in Table 2. Table 4 reports the results of 
the placebo test. Strikingly, none of the alternative measures of node importance show a consistent 
and statistically meaningful sign. Model (13) tells us that forming an additional PTA that does not 
improve its hub status does not affect value-added exports significantly. Improving distance-based 
node importance, measured by betweenness centrality in Model (14), does not increase a country's 
value-added exports, either. Finally, connecting blocs of PTA networks, measured by participation 
coefficient in Model (15), has no meaningful effect on a country's value-added exports.
T A B L E  4  Effects of alternative measures of PTA centrality: Two-way fixed effects at the country and year level 
are used for the analysis. Cross-fitting DML indicates the sample-splitting and cross-fitting panel DML estimation 
(Semenova et al., 2018). Clustered standard errors are reported in SE
Alternative measures Method
Estimates
DVA SE FVA SE
Degree (13) Cross-fitting DML (sample splitting 
and orthogonal estimation)
0.17 0.15 −0.18 0.24
Betweenness (14) Cross-fitting DML (sample splitting 
and orthogonal estimation)
−0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
Participation (15) Cross-fitting DML (sample splitting 
and orthogonal estimation)
−0.02 0.01 −0.03 0.02
T A B L E  5  Lagged variable sensitivity test
Model
One-way FE Two-way FE Between First-differenced
DVA FVA DVA FVA DVA FVA DVA FVA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PTA hubt−2 0.19*** 0.19** 0.16*** 0.14** 1.47 −1.89 0.10** 0.08
(0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (3.36) (4.66) (0.04) (0.07)
PTA hubt−1 −0.07 −0.08 −0.09** −0.10 −8.43 −0.83 0.01 0.06*
(0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06) (7.58) (10.53) (0.02) (0.04)
PTA hubt 0.07** 0.14*** 0.09*** 0.14*** 7.70 5.15 −0.02 −0.03
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Last, we checked the robustness of our findings to the lag specification using different fixed-effects 
models. Table 5 reports only the coefficients of our causal variables with different lag specifications 
to save space. The substantive results do not change much: the two-year lagged PTA hub score has 
positive and significant signs except the between estimation, which should be taken with caution due 
to the small sample size (N = 40, K = 23), and FVA in the first-differenced model. Table 5 also shows 
that PTA hub status has contemporaneous effects within countries although the effect sizes are smaller 
than those of the two-year lagged effects.
7 |  DISCUSSIONS
In her inaugural address in 2016, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen declared that strengthening 
Taiwan's connections in a PTA network was one of the most important foci of her administration:
The first step of reform is to strengthen the vitality and autonomy of our economy, rein-
force Taiwan’s global and regional connections, and actively participate in multilateral 
and bilateral economic cooperation as well as free trade negotiations including the TPP 
and RCEP.10
The newly inaugurated president's urgent emphasis on the PTA connections was triggered by 
Taiwan's isolation in a PTA network; as of 2015 Taiwan only had two PTAs with major economies 
(Singapore and New Zealand). In fact, Taiwan's isolation had been largely a result of the pressure from 
China on Taiwan's prospective PTA partners. One source reported that “China urged the European 
Union to refrain from official contact with Taiwan after the European Commission said it will con-
sider starting talks on investment with the island.”11 Taiwan's isolation in PTA networks has been 
viewed as a major source of Taiwan's economic decline.12 One of the most significant blows to Taiwan 
was the Korea–US FTA that entered into force in 2012. According to one report, “Taiwan's exports 
during the March 2014-February 2015 period fell 1.13 percent from the period of March 2011-February 
2012…However, South Korea's exports to the U.S. market gained 23.44 percent during the three year 
period.”13
The tale of Taiwan is just one example out of many cases illustrating the importance of PTA 
connections in international trade in the 21st century. However, to the best of our knowledge, there 
has been no study that explains the logic of the importance of network position in a PTA network 
and empirically examines their effects on trade flows. In this paper, we opened the black box of 
the positional importance in PTA networks that policy-makers and scholars of international trade 
have long assumed to exist. We provided a theory of the positional importance in PTA networks, 
focusing on mesolevel node importance. We explained that a country's value-added exports within 
GVCs typically stretch over multiple countries and hence are affected not just by the connections 
they themselves make, but also by connections their PTA partners (“neighbors”) make with others. 
10 “President Tsai's Inaugural Address” (http://www.roc-taiwan.org/om_en/post/171.html), emphasis added.
11 “China's Isolation Strategy Squeezes Taiwan's Exporter Sector” Bloomberg November 12, 2015 (https ://www.bloom berg.
com/news/artic les/2015-11-12/china -s-isola tion-strat egy-squee zes-taiwa n-s-expor ter-sector).
12 “Taiwan's Economic Isolation: Desperately Seeking Space” The Economist, July 13, 2013.
13 “U.S.-South Korea FTA affects Taiwan's exports: research report” Focus Taiwan, 2016/01/05, http://focus taiwan.tw/news/
aeco/20160 10500 32.aspx.
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We measured the positional importance by weighted eigenvector centrality scores, taking PTA depth 
levels as edge weights. Using the decomposed value-added export data, we predicted that an im-
provement in a country's PTA hub status would lead to an increase in its value-added exports. We 
also predicted that an improvement in a country's PTA hub status would benefit industries that use 
many intermediate goods.
The findings of our country-level analysis were consistent with our expectation. Value-added ex-
ports grows faster in countries with strong PTA hub status than in those with weak PTA hub sta-
tus. Our industry-level analysis showed that PTA hub status has significant distributional effects. 
Manufacturing sectors and service sectors that take advantage of fragmented production processes 
within GVCs gain most from an increase in PTA hub status.
A change in PTA hub status is brought by governments, while systematic changes in value-added 
exports are driven by firms in a country. Thus, there are important questions about a firm's deci-
sion-making mechanism in response to or in anticipation of changes in its country's PTA hub status. 
Unfortunately, however, we were unable to directly address this question, due to the unavailability 
of proper data. Nonetheless, we provide channels through which a country's PTA hub status affects 
firms’ decisions.
First, existing firms would expand their production facilities at home and abroad and diversify 
their product lines more aggressively when they expect their countries to be better connected with 
important countries in PTA networks. For example, the Korea–US FTA removed the 5% tariff on 
flat-screen TVs. At the same time, the Korea–EU FTA that entered into force in 2011 abolished 14% 
tariffs on flat-screen TVs. Japanese flat-screen TV makers, major competitors of Korean firms, 
were hit hard by these moves and Japanese trade officials were deeply concerned with the prospects 
of losing market shares in both Europe and North America.14 Emboldened by their country's succes-
sive move to the center of PTA networks, South Korean flat-screen TV makers made more aggres-
sive investment in next-generation technology such as OLED (organic light-emitting diode) 
displays.
Second, foreign firms expect that they can take advantage of the fragmented production processes 
by locating those hub countries that provide more secure protection for foreign investments and a 
higher credibility of commitments to trade liberalization and the harmonization of domestic rules to 
global standards (Kim, Lee, et al., 2019).
Third, changes in PTA hub status can widen extensive margins of trade. Domestic firms that 
have not previously engaged in international trade can take new opportunities in international trade 
as their country's PTA connections improve over time. As we saw in the industry-level analysis, 
changes in PTA hub status increase FVA of manufacturing sectors that can take full advantage of 
fragmented production processes in GVC. That is, changes in PTA hub status can lead to a rapid 
increase in the number and range of domestic producers involved in the export and import of in-
termediate goods.
According to our theory and empirical findings, the hub-seeking strategy in PTA networks can be 
successful if a country can be connected with many important neighbors through deep agreements. 
Although demands for hub status are almost universal across countries, several domestic and interna-
tional factors such as domestic backlashes against deep PTAs, the highly selective nature of bilateral 
PTAs, and the high cost of mega bloc PTAs will affect the distribution of hub status.
14 Mulgan and Honma (2015), p. 13; “Mindful of South Korea, Japan Considers Seeking U.S. Trade Agreement,” The Wall 
Street Journal, July 9, 2007; “The Japan syndrome: Japan worries about missing Asia's banquet of free-trade deals,” The 
Economist, May 10, 2007.
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APPENDIX 1
The Sample-spl i t t ing and Cross-f i t t ing DML Estimation
We model the amount of value-added exports of country i at year t (yit) as
dit is our key explanatory variable (PTA hub score), xit is a vector of control variables, and αi and 
νt are individual effects at the country and year level, respectively. δ is the parameter of our interest 
and we expect δ > 0.
After controlling for αi and νt through the method of fixed-effects, it is still challenging to esti-
mate δ in Equation (6) because of unknown forms of nuisance parameters (f (·), g(·), p(·), q(·)). If we 
mis-specify these functional forms, our estimate of δ will be biased and its confidence interval will 
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parameters toward zero (Naive DML in our results). The DML method allows us to learn the func-
tional form of many nuisance parameters (f (·), g(·), p(·), q(·)) from data via regularization. Then, we 
can obtain a root N consistent estimate of dit by Neyman orthogonalization (Chernozhukov et al., 
2017). For panel data, Semenova et al. (2018) recently proposed a sample splitting and cross-fitting 
DML that further ensures the orthogonalization of fitted values between equations.
For the sample-splitting and cross-fitting DML estimation, we rewrite the model by dropping our 
target variable in the first equation:
We group demeaned data into 2-fold partition (c and − c) by the year index and estimate coef-
ficients for partition c using − c and vice versa using a regularization method. The regularization 
method is chosen among the ordinary least squares (OLS), Lasso (Tibshirani, 1996), adaptive Lasso 
(Zou, 2006) by comparing the residual sum of squares in each stage.
Then, we compute the residuals for partition c using the cross-fit estimates from partition −c and 
data from partition c. The residuals for partition −c are computed in the same way. We pool the re-
siduals from all partitions and estimate δ by regressing y˜it (pooled residuals of Equation (8)) on d˜ 
(pooled residuals of Equation (9)).
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